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Abstract
When forming their preferences about the distribution of income, rational
people may be caught between two opposite forms of “tyranny.” Giving ab-
solute priority to the worst-off imposes a sort of tyranny on the rest of the
population, but giving less than absolute priority imposes a reverse form of
tyranny where the worst-off may be sacrificed for the sake of small benefits
to many well-off individuals. We formally show that this intriguing dilemma
is more severe than previously recognised, and we examine how people ne-
gotiate such conflicts with a questionnaire-experimental study. Our study
shows that both tyrannies are rejected by a majority of the participants,
which makes it problematic for them to define consistent distributive pref-
erences on the distribution.
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1 Introduction
It is now well established that people are deeply concerned about fairness
and inequality in the distribution of resources and advantages, and, more
interestingly, that there is substantial diversity in their social preferences.1
In this paper we study how people’s social preferences about the distribution
of income deal with an intriguing conflict between two very natural fairness
principles (Fleurbaey and Tungodden 2010). Each fairness principle seeks
to avoid a particular type of “tyranny”.
The first type of tyranny is where social preferences are driven entirely by
weight of numbers, as in utilitarianism, so that a tiny benefit to sufficiently
many rich individuals could justify imposing a large loss on any disadvan-
taged member of society; the second is where social preferences are driven
entirely by the interests of one person, as in maximin which gives absolute
priority to the worst-off individual, regardless of the cost to the rest of so-
ciety. It is actually possible, in theory, to find social preferences that avoid
the two types of tyrannies, but the resolution involves a further conflict with
other fundamental welfare principles that are almost always taken as given
in conventional welfare economics.2 Hence, in welfare economics we face a
dilemma in how to deal with these two tyrannies.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we show formally that this
intriguing dilemma is more severe than previously recognised. It has so
far been identified when the possible size of the population is unbounded.
We introduce slightly stronger but still compelling versions of the axioms
used to formalize the two tyrannies, and we then show that this dilemma
may occur even in small populations. Second, we study how people react
to this dilemma when they think about the distribution of income. Do
they lean in the direction of one type of “tyranny”or the other? Are they
concerned about the standard welfare principles that are taken for granted in
conventional welfare economics? An empirical analysis of the issue requires
elicitation of social preferences over possibly very large populations – in
other words in situations where laboratory experiments are impossible; so
we pursue these questions using a specially designed questionnaire study of
1See, for example Andreoni and Miller (2002), Bellemare et al. (2008), Cappelen et al.
(2007), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2013), Charness and Rabin (2002),
Engel (2011), Engelmann and Strobel (2004), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) Fisman et al.
(2007), Henrich et al. (2001), Konow (2000)
2Such social preferences have strange forms because of the violation of the Pigou-Dalton
condition and replication invariance. They either have thresholds where priority changes
sharply, or become more and more inequality averse when the population increases, which
is hard to reconcile with conventional welfare principles.
1
opinions.3 We find that a majority is indeed against both tyrannies: the
dilemma thus appears to capture an important challenge in people’s social
preferences.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 formally explains the nature
of the dilemma that lies at the heart of this paper, introduces stronger
versions of the fundamental axioms, and reports a formal result showing that
this dilemma may even occur in small populations. Sections 3 and 4 set out
our approach to an empirical investigation of the problem and present the
main results. Sections 5 and 6 examine the role of respondents’ background
in accounting for the pattern of answers to the questionnaire study and
discuss the detailed comments that they provide. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory
Social welfare functions devised by economists sometimes encounter two
problems, both of which are relevant here: (1) they may conflict with certain
ethical principles that appear to be reasonable in theory; (2) they may
conflict with judgments made by rational, well-informed people in practice.
We begin (in subsection 2.1) by setting out the possible theoretical conflict
or dilemma at the heart of the present paper; we then modify the theory
a little to nudge it in the direction of practical judgments, but show that
the dilemma remains (subsection 2.2). We then consider how the modified
theory and the puzzle that it presents can be confronted with evidence from
people’s judgments later in the paper.
2.1 The dilemma
Consider the following four welfare principles that appear to be intuitively
reasonable.
• Avoiding mob tyranny. Such a tyranny takes place when the weight
of numbers is decisive in a social welfare judgment involving many
gainers who gain very little and few losers who lose a lot (indeed the
loss may be so great that the loser is among the worst-off ex post.).
3On the issue of the questionnaire method versus laboratory experiments note that
Cappelen et al. (2011) find that questionnaire data and behavioural data support the
same conclusions on social preferences. On applications of the questionnaire-experimental
method to ethical issues underlying one or other of the tyrannies see, for example, Amiel
and Cowell (1999), Amiel et al. (2009), Amiel et al. (2012), Frohlich et al. (1987a),
Frohlich et al. (1987b), Gaertner (1994), Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
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• Avoiding individual tyranny. This tyranny takes place when the well-
being of one loser is decisive in a social welfare judgment involving
many gainers who gain a lot and one loser who loses very little.
• Respect for progressive transfers. In its strict form this means that a
transfer from a poorer to a richer member of society produces a welfare
decrease; in its weaker form it requires that such a transfer should not
increase welfare (Dalton 1920, Pigou 1912).
• Irrelevance of replication. Social-welfare comparisons of income distri-
butions are unaffected by “scaling up” the population (Dalton 1920).
It is clear that many commonly used welfare criteria are consistent with
some, but not all, of these principles. Among the most popular criteria, the
additively separable social welfare function
∑
i ϕ(xi), where xi denotes the
outcome for individual i in terms of utility, income , wealth,... and ϕ is
an increasing transform, fails to avoid mob tyranny, whereas the maximin
criterion mini xi fails to avoid individual tyranny.
Previous work has focused on the logically weakest versions of the prin-
ciples that give rise to the dilemma.4 This is the usual way in axiomatic
analysis, but it may give the impression that the dilemma is weaker than
it really is. For example, consider the following axiom to rule out mob
tyranny: “if a worst-off person is sufficiently poor and gains enough, there is
a small loss that is tolerable for all the best-off people, no matter how many
of these best-off people there are” (Fleurbaey and Tungodden 2010). This
is clearly violated by the criterion
∑
i ϕ(xi) when the potential size of the
population is unbounded. But if, instead, there were a maximum potential
size of the population, M , then even the simple utilitarian criterion
∑
i xi
satisfies the axiom. Indeed, a loss of one unit by any individual will always
prevail against a gain of 1/M units or less by the rest of the population,
when the population size cannot exceed M.
If the dilemma occurs only when there is no limit to the size of the
population, one may think that it is not a very serious issue, especially in
practical applications. But this impression is misleading. In this paper we
demonstrate that the dilemma is more severe than previously recognised, by
showing that it may also hold for small populations if the axioms contain
bounds on the parameters. The guiding intuition of our result is that even
for small population, it may not be possible to give sufficient priority to the
4See Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) and Fleurbaey et al. (2009), where impossibility
theorems are provided for a domain of potential populations that contains populations of
arbitrarily large size.
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poor person against all the rich. We therefore propose formulating a variant
of the axiom that contains bounds in the form of parameters.
A similar issue arises in connection with the following axiom that rules
out individual tyranny: “for every person there is some small loss that can
be taken as acceptable if all the other members of society have a large enough
gain and the size of the population is large enough.” In its weakest form
it is compatible with an arbitrarily high degree of priority to the worse off
(Fleurbaey and Tungodden 2010). Consider the criterion
∑
i ϕ(xi) with a
concave ϕ. This satisfies the axiom, for any degree of concavity (any degree
of inequality aversion) and arbitrarily large populations: but again one may
want to limit the degree of concavity of ϕ, otherwise individual tyranny will
prevail at some point in finite populations. Therefore we also formulate a
version of this axiom that puts a bound on the priority assigned to the loser.
2.2 Result
Consider a population of size N, belonging to N , a set of non-empty finite
subsets of positive integers. An allocation is x = (xi)i∈N ∈ R|N |+ , where
xi is the outcome for person i and |N | denotes the cardinality of N. Let
x−i = (xj)j 6=i, x−M = (xi)i∈N\M and let x(k) denote the kth component of
x by increasing order: x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ · · · ≤ x(|N |). Also let k ∗ N denote a
k-replica of N (i.e., a population of size k |N | containing the members of N
and k − 1 clones for each of them) and k ∗ x the corresponding replica of
an allocation x (i.e., an allocation giving x to k disjoint |N |-sized subsets
of k ∗ N, one of which is N itself). The subsets of worst-off and best-off
individuals are defined as follows:
W (x) =
{
i ∈ N | xi = min
j∈N
xj
}
,
B(x) =
{
i ∈ N | xi = max
j∈N
xj
}
.
The mean of the components of x is x¯ = 1|N |
∑
i∈N xi.
Social preferences are characterised by a social preordering function R
defined on N , which associates every N ∈ N with a preordering RN on R|N |+ ,
with PN denoting the asymmetric part.5 Consider the following five prop-
erties for RN in which the parameters q, r, α, β, α′, β′ are fixed real numbers
and n is a given integer:
5A preordering on R|N|+ is a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
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Weak Pareto For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ R|N |+ , if xi > yi for all i ∈ N, then
x PN y.
Pigou-Dalton For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ R|N |+ , all δ > 0, all i, j ∈ N, if
(i) xk = yk for all k 6= i, j;
(ii) xi = yi − δ ≥ yj + δ = xj ,
then x RN y.
Replication Invariance For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ R|N |+ , all k ∈ Z++, all
k ∗N ∈ N , x RN y iff k ∗ x Rk∗N k ∗ y.
Non-Aggregation 6 For all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ R|N |+ , all i ∈ N, if
(i) i ∈W (y), yi ≤ q and xi − yi ≥ α and
(ii) for all j ∈ N − i, if xj 6= yj then j ∈ B(x) ∩ B(y), yj ≥ r and
yj − xj ≤ β,
then x RN y.
Aggregation 7 For all N ∈ N such that |N | ≥ n, all x, y ∈ R|N |+ , all i ∈ N,
if (i) xi − yi ≤ β′
(ii) for all j ∈ N − i, yj − xj ≥ α′,
then y RN x.
We then obtain the following result (the proof is in Appendix 1):
Proposition 1 No social preordering function satisfies Weak Pareto, Pigou-
Dalton, Replication Invariance, Aggregation, and Non-Aggregation if N con-
tains all populations of size up to n∗ where
n∗ = n+
nα
min{q, β′}
[
α′ + 1
β
+ 1
]
2.3 Discussion
As explained in section 2.1, Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) have already
shown that a “dilemma” result similar to Proposition 1 holds in which the
6This is the axiom that protects against mob tyranny. The weaker version (“Minimal
Non-Aggregation”) used in Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) uses quantifiers: “There
exist 0 < q < r and α > β > 0.”
7This is the axiom that protects against individual tyranny. For the “Minimal Ag-
gregation” axiom used in Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010) one adapts this to “For some
N ∈ N , all x ∈ R|N|+ , all i ∈ N, there exist α′ > β′ > 0 such that for all y ∈ R|N|+ , if (i)
xi − yi ≤ β′; (ii) for all j ∈ N − i, yj − xj ≥ α′, then y RN x.
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Non-Aggregation and Aggregation axioms are replaced with weaker coun-
terparts. Minimal Non-Aggregation (see footnote 6) is weaker than the
Non-Aggregation axiom in that it puts no lower bound on the ratio β/α
(loss of the best off relative to gain of the worst off); when N contains pop-
ulations below a given size (which may be arbitrarily large), this Minimal
Non-Aggregation is satisfied even by the utilitarian criterion
∑
i xi. Minimal
Aggregation (see footnote 7) is weaker than the Aggregation axiom in that
there is no upper bound on the ratio α/β (the gain of all relative to the loss
of one) and on the required size of the population.
Proposition 1 itself says more than Fleurbaey and Tungodden (2010).
It confirms the intuition that the dilemma is more severe – it may occur
even for smaller populations – when the parameters n, α, α′ are small and
the parameters β, β′, q are large. That is, when one accepts a reduction in
the outcome for one person for the sake of a gain to all others in a small
population and with a low gain-loss ratio, while one also wants to give
priority to the worst-offs in the case of a low gain-loss ratio.
However Proposition 1 also raises what sounds like a question in practical
ethics: what are reasonable values of the parameters and what is the induced
size of the population that generates a dilemma? It is not easy to address
these issues purely on principle; and people with similar views may suggest
substantially different values. We therefore find it interesting to study what
people consider to be reasonable in this context. There is a tradition of
empirical ethics that has studied people’s attitudes about redistribution by
the use of questionnaire-experimental techniques (Amiel and Cowell 1999,
Gaertner and Schokkaert 2012). This school has examined in particular if
people endorse the Pigou-Dalton principle and has sought to estimate their
aversion to inequality. We apply this approach to the study of trade-offs
between rich and poor involving the problems of mob tyranny and individual
tyranny, and then use our result to derive from the responses the size of the
population that makes the dilemma appear for the respondents.
In summary, the tension between avoiding mob tyranny and avoiding
individual tyranny depends on the possible size of the population and on the
degree of inequality aversion that one is willing to adopt, in other words, on
how afraid of individual tyranny one is. The greater the inequality aversion
(the less one is afraid of individual tyranny), the greater the size of the
population that is needed to make mob tyranny occur. One may therefore
ask if, with the typical degree of inequality aversion that one encounters in a
society, the population size that is needed to reveal the tension is realistic or
astronomical. In the latter case the problem might be dismissed as of purely
theoretical interest; but in the former case decision-makers and practitioners
6
should seriously worry about it.
3 The empirical approach
To establish whether the two tyrannies pose a dilemma in practice we needed
to elicit people’s social preferences in situations that capture the problems
discussed in Section 2. In contrast to many contributions in the social-
preference literature, conventional laboratory experiments are not feasible
here because we focus on the nature of social preferences for moral questions
involving large populations. For this reason we have used the established
technique of preference elicitation by means of questionnaire.8 The ques-
tionnaire combines verbal and numerical questions, contains questions in
both closed and open form, and allows for respondents’ comments.
3.1 Questionnaire summary
The main part of the questionnaire consists of four scenarios, each of which
concentrates on one specific principle. In order to make the principles clear
to non-specialist respondents we take individual outcomes to be represented
by income and focus on just two groups “the poor” and “the rich,” defined
within the questionnaire as those with £10,000 and £50,000 respectively.
The questionnaire itself is reproduced in Appendix 2; here is a sketch of the
content and the structure of possible responses:
Scenario 1 (Mob tyranny) Suppose one poor person benefits from an
income increase of £G while all the rich, no matter how many there
are, suffer an income reduction of £1. If G were large enough would
this be a good idea?
• A Agree
– then specify the threshold value of G
• B Disagree
Scenario 2 (Individual tyranny) Suppose one poor person suffers from
an income cut of £1 while M rich people benefit from an increase of
£100. If M were large enough would this be a good idea?
8The method is set out in detail in Amiel and Cowell (1999); see also Gaertner and
Schwettmann (2007) and the references therein for an application focusing on equity judg-
ments that give priority to the worst-off.
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• A Agree
– then specify the threshold value of M
• B Disagree
Scenario 3 (Principle of progressive transfers) Suppose a small amount
of income ε is transferred from a rich person to a much poorer person.
Would this be a good idea?
• A Agree
• B Disagree
Scenario 4 (Replication) Suppose n1 people with income y1 experience
an income increase of ∆ and n2 people with income y2 experience an
income decrease of δ and that this change in income distribution is
considered a good idea. Would it also be a good idea if the numbers
n1 and n2 were replaced by mn1 and mn2?
• A Agree
• B Disagree
The relationship between this outline of the questionnaire and Proposition
1 can be seen by noting that q = £10, 000, r = £50, 000, α = G, β = £1,
α′ = £100, β′ = £1, n = M + 1. In each scenario the respondents were
invited to provide comments to elucidate their answers if they wished to
do so. The order in which scenarios 1 and 2 were presented was randomly
decided, with equal probability for both sequences.
In the final part of the questionnaire, we asked some questions on per-
sonal characteristics and background; details on these are to be found in the
discussion of the results in section 5.
3.2 Critical population size
The questionnaire has been conceived with a simplified version of the the-
oretical result presented above, because the values of income at the status
quo are given to the respondents and the questions bear only on income vari-
ations. The idea is still that the ethical principles underlying the scenarios
are incompatible if the possible population is large enough. The argument to
derive the dilemma unfolds in the following four simple steps, which mimic
the structure of the proof of Proposition 1.
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1. Suppose there is a population of size M + 1 containing 1 poor person
(in the questionnaire this means with £10,000) and M rich people
(with £50,000). Response A in Scenario 2 indicates that it would be
acceptable to tax £1 from the poor person to give an amount ∆ (where
∆ = £100) to each of the M rich people. So the reverse, where the
rich lose £∆ and the poor person gains £1, would be unacceptable.
2. Now replicate m− 1 times to give a population of size n = m [M + 1].
Response A in Scenario 1 implies that it is acceptable to give G to one
clone of the poor person and tax £1 from each of the rich people.
3. Equalize among all clones of the poor so that each of them gains G/m.
This would be considered acceptable by respect for Progressive Trans-
fers.
4. Now repeat this operation ∆ − 1 times so that overall the rich lose
£∆ and the poor gain ∆G/m. Steps 2 and 3 above suggest that this
should be acceptable; but if
∆G/m ≤ 1 (1)
step 1 above suggests that it must be unacceptable!
Clearly, for the contradiction in step 4 to occur, the replication factor m
must be large enough for given ∆, G for (1) to hold: specifically we need
m ≥ ∆G; this requires that the population size must satisfy n ≥ n∗, where
n∗ := ∆G [M + 1] . (2)
In our questionnaire study ∆ is fixed (at £100) but G and M are reported
by the respondents who select A in scenarios 1 and 2. So the respondents
effectively announce the critical value of n∗. The question we are interested
in is whether, according to the respondents’ views, the clash is severe (a low
n∗) or weak (incompatibility only for astronomical populations).
3.3 Sample
The questionnaire was run on a sample of 642 student respondents in three
groups. Two groups consisted of first-year and second-year students from
the Norwegian School of Economics (labelled NHH1 and NHH2 in the tables
below); the third group was from the London School of Economics and
consisted of second-year undergraduates taking a mathematically oriented
microeconomics course.
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The questionnaire was carried out under supervision during class time;
respondents were informed that the questionnaire was anonymous and were
requested not to interact with each other when filling in their responses.
3.4 Responses
We begin with an impression of the type of distributional judgments made
by those in our sample, based on an overview of the pattern of responses.
Scenario 2
A B
Scenario A Anti-Anti Maximin
1 B Aggregative Pro-Pro
Table 1: Types of response
The principal responses to the first two scenarios – on the two tyran-
nies – can be classified according to four types as in Table 1 where the
interpretation is as follows:
• The “anti-anti” respondents (in the AA category) are against both
individual tyranny and mob tyranny. Indeed the comments provided
by these respondents reveal their concern that the interests of the poor
person be protected9 but also the concern that small changes for the
poor do not dominate the wider interests of society.10
• The AB category consists of those whose responses are consistent with
the maximin principle; these respondents are against mob tyranny.
• The BA category consists of respondents whose responses are consis-
tent with the aggregative approach implicit in welfare principles such
9“The person suffering a £1 loss is already well off, so won’t be affected much, but
gains for the poorer one will increase life standard significantly.” “Any increase in income
for the person with £10,000 would be a good thing in my opinion, however it would need
an extra £10,000 to bring their living standard to decent.” “£1 is a small proportion of
£50,000. This would not reduce living standards significantly, £10,000 would help the
single person to have decent living standards.” “The ones who earn £50,000 have enough
money, and even the slightest increase of the ones who earn £10,000 is for the good.” “The
marginal utility for each pound is larger for a person with low income than for a person
with a high income. £1 reduction out of £50,000 doesn’t change so much for the person
with a high living standard.”
10“If 100 people get an increase in income of £100, it equals £10,000. A reduction of
£1 is not that heavy a loss, from my view.” “£1 is little, and if the £100 the rich ones
gain can contribute to work places and a better economy, it is worth it.”
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as
∑
i ϕ(ui); these respondents are against individual tyranny.
• BB-type responses might be given by libertarians.11
The proportions of respondents of each type for the three sub-samples
are given in Table 2. It is clear that AA is the most common type of response
in each of the sub-samples. Furthermore, adding the proportions in columns
AA and AB we can see that a majority rejects mob tyranny in scenario 1;
however, adding the proportions in columns AA and BA we can also see that
a majority also rejects individual tyranny in scenario 2! This result applies
in all sub-samples: although there is a relatively lower proportion of LSE
respondents in category AB and a relatively higher proportion in category
BB, the differences between the sub-samples are not great.
N AA AB BA BB
LSE 118 33.1% 23.7% 17.8% 25.4%
NHH1 225 33.3% 30.7% 20.0% 16.0%
NHH2 299 32.8% 30.4% 18.1% 18.7%
All 642 33.0% 29.3% 18.7% 19.0%
Notes: N is the number of participants, AA is the share of participants
rejecting both individual tyranny and mob tyranny;
AB is the share of participants rejecting only mob tyranny;
BA is the share of participants rejecting only individual tyranny;
BB is the share of participants not rejecting either of the two tyrannies.
Table 2: Distribution of Responses to Scenarios 1 and 2 by type and sample
The responses to scenarios 3 and 4 are summarised in Table 3 which
shows the proportion of respondents that endorse progressive transfers and
the irrelevance of replication. It is clear that about 50% respond in accor-
dance with the principle of progressive transfers (There is not much dif-
ference in the pattern of responses across the different sub-samples). The
proportion of the overall sample that reject both principles may seem sur-
prisingly high. However, the comments of the respondents in this category
reveal that this heterodox position was often based on some careful rea-
soning; rejection of progressive transfers on scenario 3 was justified on the
11See also Cappelen et al. (2007), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2013)
where the proportion of libertarians found is consistent with the proportion of BB-types
in the present study.
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grounds of the intrinsic rights of individuals,12 on the grounds of fairness,13
speculation about other background issues not specified in the scenario14 or
wider issues of efficiency;15 rejection of the irrelevance of replication invari-
ance on scenario 4 was justified on the basis of concern for absolute numbers
of the poor.16 However these heterodox arguments do not provide a “so-
lution” to the dilemma: it is straightforward to establish a version of the
dilemma within a framework respecting all these concerns except the last
one.17
N Progressive Transfers Progressive Replication neither
and Replication Invariance Transfers only Invariance only
LSE 118 18.6% 28.8% 11.9% 40.7%
NHH1 225 19.6% 28.0% 12.0% 40.4%
NHH2 299 11.7% 39.5% 9.7% 39.1%
All 642 15.7% 33.5% 10.9% 39.9%
Notes. N is the number of participants. Other columns show the share of participants endorsing both progressive transfers
and replication invariance, or one of them, or neither.
Of the 642 persons in total 9 did not respond to Scenario 3 and 25 did not respond to Scenario 4.
Table 3: Distribution of Responses to Scenarios 3 and 4, by type and sample.
12“There is a reason why some persons have an income of £50,000 so they should be
able to keep it for themselves.” “One’s income should correspond to his contribution.”
13“It is not fair for the person with £50,000” [and other similar comments]. “I don’t
think one person should have reduced income to increase another persons income if he
doesn’t wish this himself.” “The tax system does more than this already”.
14“Depends of level of experience, educational background, skills, if reduction is fairly
high the person that is used to the well-off lifestyle may get troubles with his economics.”
“Depends on how an individual has earned his income.” “It depends on their situation,
health, family, etc.”
15“There will be no incentives to better if everyone is equal without a reason.” “Simply
a redistribution of income: not the creation of wealth. Removes the incentives to earn
£50K.” “If you end up giving it away i.e. you can be subsistence, not work hard and get
by well enough.” “A redistribution of income can harm economy if the low income person
is not as skilled at investing as the high income person.”
16“This may result in more people becoming poorer...”
17Rights, fairness and efficiency issues can be incorporated in the model; concerns for
absolute number of the poor are indeed incompatible with replication invariance.
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4 A dilemma in practice?
A large proportion – about a third – of our respondents fall into the “Anti-
Anti” category – see table 2. For some of these the dilemma may prove to
be a real problem. Rigorously speaking, within our framework, the dilemma
concerns only the respondents who endorse all four principles by answering
A in all scenarios (and also accept Weak Pareto, which we did not investigate
empirically): at NHH, there are 33 such students (7% of a total of 467); at
LSE, there are 10 such students (8.5% of a total of 118). As we discussed in
section 2 and 3.2, the responses of this group imply a logical contradiction
for very large populations. However, it is reasonable to focus on the larger
sub-sample of the “Anti-Anti” category, since we find that G and M answers
are not significantly influenced by attitudes to the principle of transfer and
to replication.18
In order to investigate whether the dilemma is a practical problem, we
need to look at how the AA types responded in the follow-up numerical
questions on scenarios 1 and 2. Recall that question 2 on scenario 1 asked
the respondent to report a value of G, given that they had endorsed the
mob tyranny axiom; question 2 on scenario 2 asked for a value of M , given
that they had endorsed the individual tyranny axiom. A lower value of G
or a higher value of M represent two different ways of giving priority to the
poor.
Table 4 presents a summary of the responses and Figures 1 and 2 show
the marginal distributions of the reported values of G and M .19 Table
4 reveals substantial heterogeneity of response across the sub-samples. In
particular, from the lower half of Table 4 we observe that the mean value of
reported M for LSE is substantially greater than that for either of the NHH
groups. We might expect G and M to be negatively correlated, so that both
indicators of priority to the poor are in the same direction, so to speak; this
is true for the NHH1 sub-sample, but not for LSE or NHH2.20
18See Table 7 below. In other words, one could hope to convince the respondents to
endorse the principle of transfers and indifference to replication without altering their G
and M answers.
19Notes for Figures 1 and 2: G is reported threshold income in scenario 1 q2; M is
reported threshold population in scenario 2 q2; labels on horizontal axis give upper bound
of each bin into which the observations have been sorted. The figures show the distribution
just for AA types – those who responded “A” in both the first two scenarios. However
if we plot the distributions of all responses to Scenario 1 question 2 and all responses to
Scenario 2 question 2 we obtain the same shapes. Invalid responses – such as specifying
a range of values rather than a single number – have been excluded.
20There is quite a wide dispersion of reported values: 37.1% of the G responses were
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Median Mean Std. Dev. Max Obs Corr (G,M )
G
LSE 1,000 6,533.73 12,420.93 50,000 30 0.1881
NHH1 1,000 2,705.90 5,408.53 40,000 69 -0.0729
NHH2 1,000 2,870.40 4,034.79 20,000 87 0.2376
All 1,000 3,400.24 6,663.96 50,000 186 0.1898
M
LSE 500 177,494.30 375,319.50 1,000,000 30
NHH1 1,000 62,851.14 200,586.96 1,000,000 72
NHH2 500 83,394.78 249,229.86 1,000,000 93
All 1,000 90,286.29 258,297.03 1,000,000 195
n∗ (millions)
LSE 37.58 207,200.45 914,013.89 5,000,005 30
NHH1 10.01 9,790.14 25,420.50 100,001 69
NHH2 10.00 38,308.57 161,763.92 1,000,001 87
All 10.01 54,969.78 384,720.27 5,000,005 186
Notes: N(LSE)=39, N(NHH1)=75, N(NHH2)=98, N(ALL)=212
Obs: number of valid numerical responses of G and of M
G: reported threshold income in scenario 1 q2 (min val is 1)
M : reported threshold population in scenario 2 q2 (min val is 1)
n∗: critical population size for a contradiction
Table 4: AA types. Numerical responses in scenarios 1 and 2
Figures 1 and 2 show that both distributions are clearly bimodal for
all three sub-samples, and the median is much lower than the mean. This
pattern is consistent across the three sub-samples.
The lower mode in Figures 1 and 2 is striking: in the case of scenario
2 almost a quarter of the respondents say that if just one rich person ben-
efits from £100 this is worth cutting the poor person’s income by £1. The
less than 10% of the median, 15.1% were more than 10 times the median; 37.1% of the G
responses were less than 10% of the median, 44.6% of the M responses were less than 10%
of the median, 35.9% were more than 10 times the median; 22.6% of the M responses were
located at the logical minimum (1 person). The two observations of positive correlation
are attributable to two substantial outlier values of G, one of £50,000 (LSE) and one of
£20,000 (NHH2).
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Figure 1: AA types. Distribution of G
Figure 2: AA types. Distribution of M
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Figure 3: AA types. Distribution of Critical Population n∗ = 100G [M + 1]
presence of this mode might be interpreted in two ways: it could be taken
as a left-censoring of the distribution of responses; or we can see a spike at
the value 1 acting as a focal point for responses whose views are essentially
“this is a good idea, whatever the numbers”. The latter interpretation is
clearly consistent with the comments of the AA-types who responded with
the value £1 in scenario 1.21 This interpretation is also consistent with each
of two threads of comment on scenario 2: that there is a clear overall income
gain which must be desirable, whatever the value of M22 or that the loss to
the poor is vanishingly small.23 The spike would probably have been lower
if the rich person’s gain in scenario 2 had been lower than £100.
The reported values of G and M can be used to derive the critical pop-
ulation size n∗ above which the AA-position proves to be problematic in
practice; for each individual respondent one simply applies the formula (2).
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the resulting n∗ for each sub-sample of
respondents and overall; the bottom part of Table 4 gives the summary
statistics for these distributions.24
21“Any increase in income will be good for a person.” “The amount is not relevant,
seeing as those with high income lose little.” “The ones who earn £50,000 have enough
money, and even the slightest increase of the ones who earn £10,000 is for the good.” “£1
is better than nothing.”
22There were many comments along the lines of “Here, the social surplus larger...,” “this
increases the total income in the economy, which is good,”or “society earns £99.”
23“£1 in a yearly income is barely noticeable.”
24The way the distribution of n∗ changes in response to changes in the questionnaire
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How large would n∗ need to be to be effectively infinite, so that the
dilemma becomes a real problem? In Figure 325 the grey vertical line marks
the position on the horizontal scale of the total population of the world and it
is clear that a substantial proportion of each sub-sample of AA types lies to
the right of this line and that some of those observations produce values that
are hundreds of times the world population. It is also clear, from Table 4,
that the mean value of n∗ exceeds the present world population, but that the
median is a much more modest number, about 3712 million for the LSE sub-
sample, about 10 million for the NHH sub-samples and overall. However, we
might seek other reference groups to determine how large is “large.” Table
5 gives the size n of a number of possible reference groups and the value of
F (n) where F is the empirical distribution function of the computed n∗.26
If we compare the median value of n∗ with any of these reference groups we
can see that for Norway (and smaller countries) there is no problem of the
two-tyrannies dilemma if applied to the overall population; for the UK and
larger there is indeed a potential problem; Belgium is, perhaps, borderline.
In summary, our analysis indicates that, for most individuals, this dilemma
does not seem to be of practical importance for local moral questions only
involving a small number of individuals. But it may be of importance for na-
tional considerations, and most likely is relevant for moral questions related
to global and intergenerational injustice. Note that the one-many persons
tradeoffs need not occur often for the problem to be serious. The problem
aﬄicts the SWF itself: the failure to find a SWF that avoids both tyrannies
is of concern even if the instances arise only rarely in practice.
parameters is the subject of future research. The particular values presented elicit a
particular range of quantitative responses; but our goal was merely to have a preliminary
estimate of the distribution ofn∗.
25Notes. AA: those against both individual tyranny and mob tyranny. Labels on the
horizontal axis give the upper bound of each bin into which the observations have been
sorted.
26However, if we were to consider an application of our analysis to questions of inter-
generational justice then a much larger reference group would be relevant. Asheim (2010)
suggests that the number of people who will potentially live in the future is 10 million
times the current world population; if this were added to Table 5 then clearly we would
have F (n) = 100%.
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n F (n)
Vatican City 800 7.0%
Liechtenstein 36,000 14.0%
Luxembourg 508,000 24.2%
Norway 4,891,000 40.3%
Belgium 10,941,000 53.2%
UK 62,066,000 59.7%
Nigeria 159,708,000 65.6%
USA 312,247,000 66.7%
China 1,359,821,000 74.7%
World 6,916,183,000 82.3%
Source: UN Dept of Econ and Social Affairs 2013
n: size of reference group
F (n): proportion of n∗ values ≤ n
Table 5: AA types. Size of reference groups and the n∗ distribution
5 Responses to the questionnaire – the effects of
background
It is clear from the above discussion that there is considerable variability
within the combined sample in the social values implied by the questionnaire
responses. What can explain the observed heterogeneity in responses? We
first study the factors associated with the described patterns, before we
turn to a detailed analysis of how the critical population size is associated
with background variables. First, in section 5.1, we look at the factors
associated with the response patterns that were described in Section 3.4;
then, in section 5.2, we look at the influences on the numerical values that
determine the critical population size.
The variables used are mostly derived in an obvious way from the re-
sponses on the last page of the questionnaire (see Appendix 2). In addition
we had available two more dummy variables related to the way in which
the questionnaire session was run. To control for the possibility that the
ordering of the first two scenarios might affect how people respond on the
tyranny questions, half of the questionnaires presented scenarios 1 and 2 in
reverse order (variable version). Also the order of finishing the question-
naires was preserved so that we have an ordinal indicator of the time that
the respondents spent in completing the questionnaire (variable pos). The
notes to Table 6 give a description of the coding of each variable.
18
5.1 Patterns of response
To investigate the determinants of particular patterns of response we esti-
mate a standard probit model
pi = Φ(b1x1 + b2x2 + ...+ bnxn) (3)
where pi is the probability of a particular response pattern, Φ is the Normal
distribution function, (b1, ..., bn) is a vector of coefficients and (x1, ..., xn) is
a vector of characteristics.27
From the probit regression model some clear conclusions can be drawn
about the characteristics of people with a particular response pattern. First
let us examine the responses to the tyranny questions – scenarios 1 and 2.
Table 6 presents the outcome of applying the model (3) to the cases where
pi = Pr (pattern k) where k = AA, AB or BA; in each case we present the
results for the standard list of explanatory variables and for an augmented
model which incorporates the responses to the axioms of Progressive Trans-
fer and Replication Invariance as factors that may be associated with the
responses to the tyranny scenarios.
As far as the four types in Table 1 are concerned, respecting Progressive
Transfers increases the probability of being of type AB. Violation of Repli-
cation Invariance reduces the probability that the person responds AA; it
also increases the probability that the person responds BB.28
More right-wing political views increase the probability of a type BA
response (not concerned about mob tyranny, concerned about individual
tyranny) and decrease the probability of a type AB response; males are more
likely to have a BA type of response pattern and less likely to be of AB type.
Finally note that there is an ordering effect – putting scenario 2 first reduces
the probability of an AB response and increases the probability of a BA
response. This priming effect means that thinking about a non-aggregation
scenario first pushes respondents in the non-aggregation direction, making
them less prone to accept aggregation later and vice versa.
27As a robustness check we applied this model both in an untransformed version – where
the xs are simply the raw values of the variables described above – and a transformed
version – where the explanatory variables familyincome and prospects are replaced by
exp(familyincome) and exp(prospects). We used this transformation because, instead of
data recorded in monetary units (where it is common to take a log transformation), our
data are on a scale of 1 to 7.
28Underlying these conclusions is the following result: if the subject endorses Progressive
Transfers or Replication Invariance then he is more likely to respond A in scenario 1 (in
the case of Progressive Transfers this is to be expected).
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Now let us consider the “basic” distributional principles, respect for Pro-
gressive Transfers and for Replication Invariance, where pi in (3) means
“probability that response conforms to the principle.” Table 8 shows that,
once again, political views and sex of the respondent are important: being
female or being more right wing is related to being more likely to reject
the principle of progressive transfers (see the results from scenario 3): the
female effect is in line with findings in other contexts (Amiel and Cowell
2002, 2007). Being female means that you are also more likely to reject
Replication Invariance. The conclusions remain unchanged if we use the
transformed version of the model; it is also clear that the other personal
characteristics, version of the questionnaire, the length of time the person
took over the responses and the sub-sample dummies play no role.
5.2 Reported thresholds – effects of background
We may also investigate the effect of background variables on the threshold
income G (scenario 1, question 2) and the threshold number M (scenario
2, question 2). The principal results are summarised in Table 7. This
reports the results of a simple loglinear regression against personal charac-
teristics; again we do this for the basic set of explanatory variables and for
the augmented model that also uses the responses to scenarios 3 and 4 as
explanatory variables.29
We observe that family income, income prospect, sex, and political views
are associated with reported thresholds G and M , whereas the responses
to scenario 3 and 4 have no association with reported G and M . Higher
family income, left-wing political views, and surprisingly, being a male, are
factors associated with giving more priority to the poor in scenario 1, that
is, assigning a lower value of G. In contrast, being male is associated with
given less priority to the poor in scenario 2. In scenario 2, there is no
significant associations with family income and political views, but higher
income prospects are associated with giving less priority to the poor in these
situations. Finally, we note that the ordering of scenarios also matter for
29As robustness checks we also did the following. (a) We tried using exp(familyincome)
and exp(prospects) as explanatory variables rather than their untransformed counterparts
– again this change in specification had no effect. (b) Using the same sub-sample of
respondents we tried a simple linear regression of G and M : in this case only nhh1 was
significant (in the G equation). (c) We also ran the equations on the full sample applying
a Heckman regression to allow for non-response on question 2 where the person gave
response B rather than A in question 1. This led to a set of coefficient estimates and
P-values that were very similar to those reported in the simple regression of Table 7.
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Type AA Type AB Type BA
version 0.0689 0.0672 -0.2326∗∗ -0.2457∗∗ 0.2026∗ 0.2287∗
(-1.01) (0.62) (-2.14) (-2.19) (1.70) (1.87)
pos 0.2244 0.2405 -0.0112 -0.0497 -0.0508 -0.0490
(1.23) (1.29) (-0.06) (-0.26) (-0.24) (-0.23)
nhh1 -0.0174 -0.0405 0.2463 0.1957 -0.0159 0.0673
(-0.11) (-0.26) (1.50) (1.17) (-0.09) (0.37)
nhh2 -0.0165 -0.0089 0.2571 0.1645 -0.0044 0.0778
(-0.11) (-0.06) (1.58) (0.98) (-0.02) (0.42)
sex 0.1319 0.0935 -0.1849∗ -0.2124∗ 0.1694 0.1993
(1.21) (0.83) (-1.66) (-1.84) (1.36) (1.55)
age -0.0030 -0.0028 0.0147 0.0174 -0.0354 -0.0437
(-0.12) (-0.11) (0.59) (0.70) (-1.05) (-1.26)
politicalviews 0.0434 0.0594 -0.1428∗∗∗ -0.1283∗∗ 0.1070∗ 0.1126∗
(0.91) (1.19) (-2.92) (-2.50) (1.94) (1.94)
familyincome -0.0535 -0.0586 -0.0258 -0.0021 0.0360 0.0026
(-0.98) (-1.06) (-0.45) (-0.04) (0.59) (0.04)
prospects 0.0346 0.0085 -0.0875 -0.0905 0.0413 0.0341
(0.49) (0.12) (-1.17) (-1.18) (0.52) (0.42)
progressivetransfers 0.0039 0.2504∗∗ -0.1160
(0.04) (2.19) (-0.94)
replication 0.3279∗∗∗ 0.0740 -0.2176
(2.74) (0.59) (-1.52)
cons -0.6972 -0.6709 0.3845 0.1055 -1.1975 -0.8335
(-1.01) (-0.95) (0.55) (0.15) (-1.40) (-0.94)
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
version: 1 if scenarios 1 and 2 were in the reverse order, 0 otherwise.
pos: position in sample (small values = took longer to complete)
nhh1, nhh2: sub-sample dummies
age: in years
sex: 1 if reported male, 0 otherwise
pol: self-rated political views; seven-point scale from left (1) to right (7)
familyincome: self-rated income position of family looking back 10 years
prospects: prospective income position of self looking forward 10 years
progressivetransfers: 1 if in line with principle of progressive transfers, 0 otherwise
replication: 1 if in line with principle of replication, 0 otherwise
Table 6: Probit Results for Question 1 (scenarios 1 and 2) by types
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Threshold income, log(G) Threshold number, log(M )
Basic Augmented Basic Augmented
model model model model
version -0.6750∗∗ -0.6166∗ 1.9204∗∗∗ 2.1633∗∗∗
(-2.04) (-1.81) (3.74) (4.17)
pos -0.0461 0.1041 -0.1204 0.0339
(-0.08) (0.18) (-0.13) (0.04)
nhh1 -1.0029∗ -0.9830∗ 0.7365 0.8753
(-1.93) (-1.88) (0.90) (1.07)
nhh2 -1.2340∗∗ -1.2929∗∗ -0.1073 -0.0535
(-2.40) (-2.46) (-0.13) (-0.07)
sex -0.6091∗ -0.5889∗ -2.2660∗∗∗ -2.3302∗∗∗
(-1.79) (-1.67) (-4.18) (-4.18)
age 0.0769 0.0829 0.0606 0.0758
(0.94) (1.00) (0.40) (0.50)
politicalviews 0.4323∗∗∗ 0.4162∗∗∗ -0.0443 -0.0591
(2.88) (2.66) (-0.19) (-0.24)
familyincome -0.4008∗∗ -0.4117∗∗ 0.1919 0.1847
(-2.15) (-2.17) (0.72) (0.69)
prospects 0.2398 0.1347 -0.6647∗∗ -0.7872∗∗
(0.93) (0.51) (-1.98) (-2.34)
progressivetransfers -0.0467 0.7766
(-0.13) (1.44)
replication 0.0762 0.7961
(0.21) (1.41)
cons 4.5041∗ 4.9465∗∗ 7.6591∗∗ 7.1676∗
(1.90) (2.00) (2.00) (1.86)
R2 0.0679 0.0665 0.1372 0.1597
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
Sample: those with a non-null response to question 2 in each scenario
Variables: as for Table 6
Table 7: Regression Results for Question 2 (scenarios 1 and 2)
22
Progressive Transfers Replication Invariance
untransformed transformed untransformed transformed
version -0.0202 -0.0092 -0.0100 -0.0009
(-0.20) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-0.01)
pos 0.0412 0.0498 -0.0408 -0.0199
(0.23) (0.28) (-0.21) (-0.10)
nhh1 0.0719 0.0457 0.0433 0.0310
(0.46) (0.30) (0.27) (0.19)
nhh2 0.1502 0.1306 -0.2211 -0.2328
(0.98) (0.86) (-1.35) (-1.43)
sex 0.1894∗ 0.2028∗ 0.1907 0.2163∗
(1.77) (1.90) (1.64) (1.87)
age -0.0027 -0.0013 -0.0115 -0.0071
(-0.11) (-0.06) (-0.43) (-0.27)
politicalviews -0.2156∗∗∗ -0.2158∗∗∗ -0.0743 -0.0689
(-4.55) (-4.54) (-1.48) (-1.37)
familyincome -0.0411 0.0000 -0.0273 -0.0001
(-0.77) (0.00) (-0.48) (-0.34)
prospects -0.0043 -0.0002 0.1154 0.0002
(-0.06) (-0.68) (1.51) (0.92)
cons 1.0210 0.8231 -0.5064 -0.2053
(1.52) (1.48) (-0.69) (-0.34)
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%
version: 1 if scenarios 1 and 2 were in the reverse order, 0 otherwise.
pos: position in sample (small values = took longer to complete)
nhh1, nhh2: sub-sample dummies
sex: 1 if reported male, 0 otherwise
pol: self-rated political views; seven-point scale from left (1) to right (7)
familyincome: self-rated income position of family looking back 10 years
prospects: prospective income position of self looking forward 10 years
Table 8: Probit Results for Scenario 3 (Progressive Transfers) and Scenario
4 (Replication Invariance)
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threshold responses. A participant who is first presented with the individual
tyranny scenario, assigns less priority to the poor in both scenarios.
6 Discussion: Comments by respondents
The comments provided by the participants may reveal something about
what our respondents thought they were doing and something about why
the tyranny puzzle emerges.
As Table 10 shows the breakdown across the four scenarios and across
the three subgroups. 36 percent of the student-respondents were motivated
to comment (231 out of 642) on at least one of the scenarios. It is clear that
far fewer found something to say about Scenario 4 than the others.
N Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Any
LSE 118 42 42 35 19 56
NHH1 225 22 34 27 6 53
NHH2 299 78 68 61 35 122
All 642 142 144 123 60 231
Notes: N is the number of participants, Columns “Scenario 1”,..., “Scenario 4” give number of participants offering
a comment on each scenario. “Any” gives numbers commenting on any of the scenarios.
Table 9: Participation in comments
What predisposes respondents to provide a written comment?
At first glance it seems that being from the LSE (where 47% of the respon-
dents commented) rather than NHH (where 33% commented) is an impor-
tant factor. But this is to overlook the heterogeneity in the NHH combined
sample. The proportion of the NHH2 sub-sample that commented (43%) is
not significantly different from that of the LSE, but of course there is a big
difference between the NHH1 proportion and either of the other subgroups.
Both LSE and NHH2 are typically second-year students, so it may be that
longer experience of university makes one more willing to comment. How-
ever, there is no significant difference in the overall mean age of commenters
and non-commenters. In fact the only personal characteristic which does
show up as important in understanding the difference between commenters
and non-comments is the respondent’s political views, which is not surpris-
ing since we saw in section 5 that political views were highly significant in
terms of response pattern (those reporting as right-wing were more likely to
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be more concerned about individual tyranny and less about mob-tyranny).
We also find that the individual is more likely to comment if his or her po-
litical views are to the left (the proportion of those with politicalviews< 4
is significantly higher in the “commenters” sub-sample).
rank Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
1 Insignificance [A] Efficiency [A] Entitlement [B] Efficiency [B]
2 Concern for poor [A] Numbers [A] Concern about equality [A,B] Proportionality [A]
3 Utilitarian [A] Concern for poor [A,B] Fairness [B] (Inflation)
4 (Concern about equality) Concern about equality [B] (Efficiency) (Fairness)
5 (Fairness) Utilitarian [A,B] (Utilitarian)
6 (Numbers) Insignificance [A] (Concern for poor)
Fairness [B]
Notes: Rank 1,..,6 refer to rank of the comment category for each scenario by numbers of comments. Parentheses
indicate cases where there were fewer than 10 comments in a particular category for a particular scenario. [A], [B]
indicates whether comment type was principally associated with A or B response
Table 10: Category ranking of comments
What type of comments?
Of course, in all three sub-samples, there was considerable variation in the
type of comment made: some provided an ethical or economic argument;
some gave a reaction based on intuition; some just wanted to hedge their
response to the scenario with a request for more information. Table 10
gives a snapshot view of the categories of comments, scenario by scenario.
Where a particular comment type is strongly associated with a specific A or
B answer within a scenario this has been indicated by an [A] or [B] label
as appropriate; where a comment type was associated with both A and B
answers the label [A,B] is used (for example “Concern about equality” can
cut both ways: some respondents commented that inequality is good for
incentives) .
The “Insignificance” category – top-ranked in Scenario 1 and quite low
down for Scenario 2 and associated overwhelmingly with “A” answers – is
a typical example of intuitive comments (“An income reduction of £1 is
negligible, no matter how many are concerned.”). Sometimes these intuitive
comments hint at a utility basis for their reasoning but in general explicitly
utilitarian arguments are quite low in the comment ranking (“The marginal
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utility of such a very small increase in income to a person at subsistence level
will be huge. On the other hand, marginal utility of £1 to £50,000 people
income will be minimal.”). The “Efficiency” comments – top-ranked in
Scenarios 2 and 4 – typically have to do with concern about national income
(“The distribution of income should maximize the society’s total income”)
and about individual incentives and skills (“There will be no incentives to
be better if everyone is equal without a reason”; “A redistribution of income
can harm economy if the low income person is not as skilled at investing as
the high income person”) It is interesting that that the top-ranked category
for Scenario 3 (the simple progressive transfer) is “Entitlement,” which is
typically expressed in comments such as “Those with high wages may have
deserved the high wages - does not deserve to be deprived of it”, “People get
rewarded for their work”, “There is no reason why they should give their
money away.” Unsurprisingly these comments are typical for persons at the
right wing of the political spectrum (with politicalviews> 4).
However, one might be surprised by the fact that “Fairness” (or unfair-
ness) does not feature higher in the category rankings. One reason for this
is that sometimes the responses straddle more than one category, so that
fairness concerns also enter some of the comments included in “Concern for
poor” and “Concern about equality” (at one end of the political spectrum)
and “Entitlement” (at the other end of the spectrum). Furthermore it is
interesting to note that in scenarios 1 and 2 (mob and individual tyranny)
the comments reveal concern for the welfare of the poor rather than con-
cern for equality per se, whereas in scenario 3 the comments can largely be
characterised as a simple dichotomy between the right-wing “Entitlement”
view30 and the more left-wing “Concern for equality.” Fairness may also
have been implicit in the comments of those who stated some version of a
proportionality argument in commenting on scenario 4.
The “Numbers” category is the major example of an implicit request for
more information. Typically this expressed the thought the person would
need to know more precisely the numbers involved before committing to one
or other of the propositions in the scenario.
Three lessons can be drawn from the written comments. First, the com-
ments do not undermine the validity of the questions asked or the ability of
the respondents to understand them. Second, in evaluating ethical propo-
sitions people may rely on simple intuition rather than the niceties of a
30For experimental studies on the role of entitlements see, for example Cappelen et al.
(2007), Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2013), Cappelen, Moene, Sørensen,
and Tungodden (2013), Konow (2000).
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formal welfare-economic argument; this pragmatic approach plays an im-
portant role in understanding the “A”-responses in Scenario 1. Third, some
apparently basic principles – such as the principle of progressive transfers –
are not accepted by respondents, either because they demand more contex-
tual information, or because they see it as being in conflict with other basic
principles such as that which we have characterised as “Entitlement”.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the tyranny puzzle represents a real dilemma for people
in practical reasoning. Among the students in the present study, there was
a majority against both individual tyranny and mob tyranny Indeed, in the
four categories of possible responses in our “tyranny” scenarios, the “Anti-
Anti” case is a clear winner. This fact is in the context of mainly coherent
views from our respondents on all four principles (the two tyrannies plus
progressive transfers and replication), backed by a large number of comments
explaining their reasoning.
We have also shown that the population size does not have to be all that
large to make this dilemma a practical problem. To summarize, whether
there is a dilemma facing Anti-Anti people in practice depends on the size
of the population under consideration, as we explained in section 2: think of
this as the potential size of a reference group. We can compute the required
critical size from the questionnaire responses and it is not necessarily astro-
nomical: the reference group does not need to be all that large to present
a problem. To summarise roughly, three quarters of our respondents would
face a dilemma if the reference group were as huge as China; but (more
surprisingly perhaps) about a quarter of our respondents would still face a
dilemma if the reference group were as tiny as Luxembourg.
The respondents’ backgrounds are associated with their responses to
these dilemmas. In particular, we note that right-wingers and males are
more willing to tolerate mob tyranny and less willing to tolerate individual
tyranny.
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Appendix 1: Proof
The following is the proof of the proposition in section 2.2.
Proof. Let N be such that |N | = n. For simplicity of notation, we
assume N = {1, ..., n} .
Consider an allocation x ∈ Rn+ such that for all i, j > 1, xi = xj and for
all j > 1, xj = r + 1 > r > q = x1 > 0.
Let y ∈ Rn+ be such that:
- for all i, j > 1, yi = yj ;
- for all j > 1, yj = xj + α
′ > r > q = x1 > y1 = x1 − β′ > 0 (case q > β′);
- for all j > 1, yj = xj + α
′ > r > q = x1 > y1 = 0 (case q ≤ β′).
By Aggregation, y RN x.
Let m =
[
α′+1
β
]+
(the first integer that is at least as great as α
′+1
β ) and
γ = α
′+1
m . This guarantees that γ ≤ β and for all j > 1, r ≤ yj − mγ =
r + 1 + α′ −mγ ≤ xj = r + 1. Let δ = (x1 − y1)/ (m+ 1) and p = [α/δ]+ .
We now consider the following sequence, where the first allocation is a
p-replica of y. We assume for the moment that the population of this size is
in the domain N .
p ∗ y =
y1, . . . , y1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
, (yj , . . . , yj)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 ,
z1 =
y1 + pδ, y1, . . . , y1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p−1
, (yj − γ, . . . , yj − γ)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 ,
w1 =
y1 + δ, . . . , y1 + δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
, (yj − γ, . . . , yj − γ)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 ,
and for t = 1, ...,m− 1,
zt+1 =
y1 + tδ + pδ, y1 + tδ, . . . , y1 + tδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
p−1
, (yj − (t+ 1)γ, . . . , yj − (t+ 1)γ)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 ,
wt+1 =
y1 + (t+ 1)δ, . . . , y1 + (t+ 1)δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
, (yj − (t+ 1)γ, . . . , yj − (t+ 1)γ)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 .
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By Non-Aggregation, z1 Rp∗N p∗y and, for t = 1, ...,m−1, zt+1 Rp∗N wt.
Observe that for all j > 1, yj −mγ > r, so that in this sequence the best-
off are always better-off than r, as requested for the application of Non-
Aggregation. Similarly, y1 + mδ < q, meaning that the worst-off is always
below q.
For every t = 1, ...,m, by applying Pigou-Dalton p − 1 times (between
the first individual and the next p− 1 individuals), one has wt Rp∗N zt.
By transitivity, it follows that wm Rp∗N p ∗ y, where wm is equal to:
wm =
y1 +mδ, . . . , y1 +mδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
, (yj −mγ, . . . , yj −mγ)j>1︸ ︷︷ ︸
p
 .
One has y1 + mδ < x1 and for all j > 1, yj − mγ < xj , so that by
Weak Pareto, p ∗ x P p∗N wm. Hence, by transitivity, p ∗ x P p∗N p ∗ y. By
Replication Invariance, x PN y, which contradicts the supposition in the
first part of this step of the proof.
The dimension of y is n. The value of p is no greater than
α
δ
+ 1 =
α (m+ 1)
x1 − y1 + 1
≤ 1 + α
x1 − y1
(
α′ + 1
β
+ 2
)
= 1 +
α
β′
(
α′ + 1
β
+ 2
)
(case q > β′)
= 1 +
α
q
(
α′ + 1
β
+ 2
)
(case q ≤ β′)
which implies that the possible size of a p-replica of y is at most n times
this quantity. Therefore the above contradiction will occur if N contains all
populations of that size or less.
Appendix 2: Questionnaire
The following is the standard version of the questionnaire used in this study.
About half of the respondents received an alternate version that presented
the second scenario before the first.
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Questionnaire  
 
Ethical views on the distribution of income 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey. We are interested in your opinion on ethical issues 
related to the distribution of income in society. Your response will be most important for our 
research project, so we ask you carefully to consider the questions that we pose below. We are 
not looking for the “right” answers to the questions, so please feel free to express your views on 
these issues. The questionnaire is anonymous, so we will not at any point ask you to reveal your 
identity.  
 
The questions are stated with reference to a society where the average annual income of an 
individual is £20,000 and the lowest annual income is £10,000, and where all individuals work 
equally hard and have the same needs. In this society, an annual income of £10,000 ensures a 
living standard slightly above the subsistence level, whereas an annual income of £20,000 
ensures a decent living standard. In each of the scenarios we ask you to consider, there is an 
unforeseen event which happens this year. Its effects on people’s living standards are limited to 
this year only and differ across income groups. So this means that in all the following years 
everybody’s living standard are unaffected by this event. 
 
Please note that this is not a test of logic. Each of the questions is a “stand alone”, so it can be 
answered independently of any of the other questions.   
 
Scenario 1: 
o everyone with income over £50,000 experiences a £1 reduction in income; 
o one person with income of £10,000 experiences an increase in income; 
o no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
 A: “if the gain for the person with £10,000 is sufficiently large, this 
is a good thing no matter how many people have incomes over 
£50,000” 
 
 B: “even if the person with £10,000 gains a huge amount, this is not 
a good thing if there are very many people with incomes over 
£50,000” 
 
   
▪ If you selected A, how large must the gain be for the person with £10,000 to ensure 
that this is a good thing? 
£1    £10    £50    £100    £500    £1,000    £5,000    £10,000    other (£_________) 
 
 
 
 
▪ Please feel free to explain your answer: ………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Scenario 2: 
o one person with income of £10,000 experiences a £1 reduction in income; 
o all persons with income over £50,000 experience a £100 increase in income;  
o no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
 A: “if the number of  persons with income over £50,000 is sufficiently 
large, this is a good thing” 
 
 B: “even if the number of  persons with income over £50,000 is very 
large, this is not a good thing”  
 
   
▪ If you selected A, how many people must have an income over £50,000 to ensure that 
this is a good thing? 
 
 1    10    50   100    500    1,000    10,000    100,000     1,000,000  other (_________) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
▪ Please feel free to explain your answer: ………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 3: 
o one person with income of £10,000 experiences an increase in income; 
o one person with income of £50,000 experiences a corresponding decrease of exactly the 
same amount;  
o no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
 A: “this is a good thing, as long as the person who starts out with 
£10,000 does not end up richer than the person who starts out with 
£50,000” 
 
 B: “even if the person who starts out with £10,000 does not end up 
richer than the person who starts out with £50,000, this is not 
necessarily a good thing” 
 
   
▪ Please feel free to explain your answer:   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Scenario 4: 
o everyone with income of £10,000 experience an increase in income; 
o everyone with income of £50,000 experience a decrease in income; 
o no-one else is affected. 
 
▪ Which of the following views do you agree with? 
 A: “if this were a good thing, then it would also be a good thing if 
the number of persons at all income levels in society were doubled 
(i.e., a doubling of the number of persons with  £10,000, £50,000, 
and so on)” 
 
 B: “even if this were a good thing, it would not necessarily be a 
good thing if the number of persons at all income levels in society 
were doubled (i.e., a doubling of the number of persons with  
£10,000, £50,000, and so on)” 
 
   
▪ Please feel free to explain your answer:   
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Background information 
 What is your age?   _____ years 
 What is your gender? Male   Female 
 Are you a student? Y   N 
 (For students) What is your field? __________ 
 (For employed non-students) What is your profession?  __________ 
 
 How would you rate your political views? Please 
put a √ on this scale. 
 
 “How would you rate your family's income ten 
years ago (relative to average income in the 
country where you lived then)?” 
 
 “How would you rate your own income prospects 
ten years from now (relative to average income in 
the country where you plan to live)?” 
 
 
“poor” “rich”
 
“poor” “rich”
 
“left” “right” 
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